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THE SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER'S
OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN: CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN THE PRESUMPTION OF A
UNION'S MAJORITY STATUS
The national labor policy guarantees the right of employees to
bargain collectively with their employers through an elected collec-
tive bargaining representative.' This right to bargain collectively is
protected by requiring a successor employer' in most cases to recog-
nize and bargain with the union after he assumes ownership from
the predecessor employer.3 The successor's bargaining obligation
does not stem directly from the National Labor Relations Act (the
"Act"), but is purely a creation of the National Labor Relations
Board (the "Board") pursuant to its Congressional mandate to
1. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The National Labor Relations Act, (the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§
141-187 (1976) is administered by the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board").
2. The "successor employer" will hereinafter be referred to as a "successor." The term,
in itself, carries no implication of an obligation to bargain. The original employer will herein-
after be referred to as the "predecessor."
In order to identify a successor, the Board will look to a wide variety of factors such as (a)
percentage of the predecessor's employees in the successor's work force (a majority constitutes
strong evidence of a union majority), (b) the personnel policy of the predecessor compared
with that of the successor, (c) whether or not there has been a lapse in production between
the predecessor's and successor's tenure of ownership, (d) whether there has been a change
in products manufactured and (e) whether there has been a change in plant location or
internal operations. See Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successor-
ship-A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Slicker]. See also Morris & Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement:
Accomodating Wiley and Bums, 59 U.VA. L. REV. 1359 (1973). For a good discussion of the
obligations of successor employers see Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor
Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bargaining Obligations].
3. There are three foundation cases decided by the Supreme Court establishing the duties
of the successor to bargain. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. 543, 550-51 (1964), held that
a successor may be required to comply with the duty to arbitrate arising from the predeces-
sor's collective bargaining agreement in circumstances where the successor hired all of the
original corporation's employees. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 281
(1972), held that a successor may be obligated to bargain when the business unit, after the
change in employers, is identical to the unit prior to the change and the successor has hired
a substantial percentage of its predecessor's employees. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local
Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262-63 (1974) held that a successor employer who purchased
the assets of a restaurant and motor lodge, and who expressly did not assume any of the
seller's collective bargaining obligations, was not required to arbitrate with the union since
there was no substantial continuity of identity in the work force hired by the successor.
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expedite national labor policy and objectives.' In the successor
context, labor policy embodies the often conflicting goals of preserv-
ing industrial peace by maintaining rights accrued through collec-
tive bargaining and protecting the employees' freedom of choice.5
The conflict is illustrated by the Board's recognition that if the
union's actual majority status vascillated as much as the normal
employee's sentiment toward the union, then effective collective
bargaining agreements would be prevented and industrial stability
would suffer.' Consequently, the Board has an interest in reducing
the frequency of challenges to the union's majority status through
elections. In the process of so doing employees' free choice may be
limited .'
Although the successor is usually required to bargain with the
collective bargaining representative of the predecessor's employees,
there are circumstances where he can refuse to do so. If the successor
can show (1) an actual loss of the union's majority status or (2) a
"good faith doubt" based upon facts which justify a reasonable
belief that the union has lost its majority status,' he may ignore
demands that he bargain. Under these circumstances, labor policy
recognizes that when a reasonable good faith doubt is shown by the
successor, stable bargaining relationships will be maintained and
industrial stability will not suffer. This Note will examine how the
current law defining good faith doubt (1) creates the potential for
inconsistent decisions, (2) reflects generalizations not based upon
empirical fact, and (3) discourages adequate judicial review of deci-
sions made by the Board. Finally, the national labor policy will be
reviewed in light of these circumstances. This Note concludes that
the policy, as currently interpreted, unreasonably sacrifices the de-
termination of actual employee free choice.
4. See Slicker, supra note 2, at 1053.
5. Ranch-Way, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1971); General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). Statutory support for this notion is found in 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
See also NLRB v. Thompson Prod., Inc., 130 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1942).
6. See Golden State Bottling v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973); Slicker, supra note 2, at
1052.
7. See Bargaining Obligations, supra note 2, at 761.
8. Band-Age, Inc. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1976); Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB,
495 F.2d 1131, 1139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc.
v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 1969).
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I. The Substantive Law of Good Faith Doubt
A successor must show an actual loss of the union's majority
status or a "good faith doubt" based upon facts which justify a
reasonable belief that the union has-lost a majority status in order
to avoid his obligation to bargain.' The Board's decision as to
whether or not an employer has a reasonable good faith doubt of a
union's majority status will depend on combinations of facts. Due
to the difficulty of placing these facts into recurring patterns, the
Board makes decisions in a case-by-case fashion. Generally, it has
been reluctant to enunciate broad principles in order to allow itself
maximum discretion. 0 The result of this approach has been to de-
crease the predictability of Board rulings in similar factual con-
texts."
Although good faith doubt must be based upon "objective cri-
teria,"'" these considerations have never been satisfactorily illus-
trated. Clearly, an employer's good faith sincerity or other purely
subjective evidence'3 is not enough to justify a reasonable good faith
doubt, although such evidence may contribute to the proof of a
reasonable good faith doubt. Certain criteria have been recognized
as distinctly relevant to the successor's reasonable doubt of a
union's majority status. 4 Successors have often relied on the follow-
ing changes in the company as evidence of changing employee senti-
ments toward the union: the extent to which the business is reduced
in size;' 5 corporate structural change;' the fact that employees were
9. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
10. NLRB v. Boston Needham Indus. Cleaning Co., 526 F.2d 74, 75 (1st Cir. 1975).
11. See notes 49-56 infra and accompanying text. NLRB v. Gen. Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d
894, 905 (2d Cir. 1971). The court noted that the Board issued a bargaining order with a "lack
of intelligible explanation of apparently differing results in other cases where the case for a
bargaining order was at least as strong." Id.
12. Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
838 (1974). United States Gypsum Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 601 (1966) (objective grounds for doubt-
ing the union's majority status must be shown in order to raise "a question of representation"
under § 9c of the National Labor Relations Act).
13. Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir. 1975).
14. The discussion in Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974), relates exclusively to an incumbent employer's good faith doubt.
15. NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952). There, the court enforced a bargaining
order from the Board where the successor retained only eight of the predecessor's twenty-five
employees. Although "the work force was considerably reduced, that factor alone does not
justify the refusal to bargain." Id. at 803.
16. International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
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once represented by a different union;" changes in the employee
complement of the successor;'" accretion of the predecessor into the
successor;' 9 the fact that a new union was inappropriate to the re-
quirements of the employees;20 and written and oral statements by
employees."
The law governing the obligations of the successor has borrowed
the notion of good faith doubt from the factual context of the
"incumbent employer."" Certain general principles are clearly un-
derstood about good faith doubt in the context of an incumbent.
The employer must produce clear and "convincing evidence" of the
loss of majority status based upon objective considerations." These
"objective criteria" must be "unambiguous."" Without additional
facts indicating the identity and number of employees no longer
favoring the union, the following criteria do not satisfy the definition
396 U.S. 889 (1969). Substantial changes in personnel of an automobile dealership by fran-
chise purchasers, plus changes in operational structure of the dealership negated the pre-
sumption of the union's majority status. Less than a majority of the personnel hired in the
new business were members of the union prior to the purchase of the dealership. Id. at 1138.
17. NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1964).
18. Western Distributing Co. v. NLRB, 102 L.R.R.M. 2510 (10th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1972). But note that employee turnover
without other evidence does not validate good faith doubt. Id.
19. International Ass'n of Mach. & Aero. Wkrs. v. NLRB, 498 F.2d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Forty-one of the "distinct and functionally separate operation of mailing and distributing
items" were joined by "accretion" to a much larger, pre-existing bargaining unit "without
opportunity for expression of assent or objection on the part of the 41 persons thus added."
Id. at 683. This case may question the notion that a rebuttable presumption of the union's
majority status exists after an "accretion" of one business into another, stating that "[flor
a duty to bargain with the Union to survive [a takeover] there should be some significant
indication that a majority of the employees concerned desired that the Union bargain for
them collectively." Id. at 682.
20. Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case, the
court upheld the Board's rejection of a successor's contention that the execution of multiple
employment contracts covering individual segments of one originally certified unit consti-
tuted an improper division of the unit originally determined to be appropriate. The court
found that: neither the predecessor nor the successor was in a position to bargain with the
original unit; and the employer never expressed a doubt of the original unit's appropriateness
when it rejected the union's bargaining demands.
21. Wallace Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 416 (1969).
22. Any employer who may have a good faith doubt of the pro-union sentiments of his
employees for reasons not connected with a change in ownership of the business will be
referred to herein as an "incumbent employer."
23. J. Ray McDermott & Co., v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850, 858 (5th Cir. 1978); Nazareth
Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 880 (2d Cir. 1977).
24. NLRB v. Colonial Knitting Corp., 464 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1972).
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of "objective criteria": an employee's knowledge of "overwhelming
sentiment" against the union reported to the employer; 5 the filing
of a union decertification petition by thirty percent of the employ-
ees;2" manifestations of mere dissatisfaction or lack of interest in the
union on the part of the employees;" or the employers' "frame of
mind" based upon employee turnover. 8 Other facts, such as em-
ployee turnover, 9 employees' failure to join a strike or their subse-
quent abandonment thereof,3" or less than majority support for
union decertification3 may support the employer's subjective view
that the union has lost majority status but do not alone justify the
logical inference that his employees no longer want the union to
represent them. The "objective criteria" must explicitly indicate a
change in the employees' choice. Often facts which may support
some justifiable doubt on the part of the employer of the union's
majority status are not sufficiently "objective" to warrant the find-
ing of reasonable good faith doubt.32
25. Allied Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 863, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
26. Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1975).
27. Id.
28. NLRB v. King Radio Corp., 510 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 1975).
29. Id.
30. Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31. 519 F.2d at 490.
32. NLRB v. Gallaro, 419 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1969). In Gallaro an employee petition was
circulated by the employees themselves and signed by seventy percent of the unit, thus
justifying the employer's alleged good faith doubt. The issue, therefore, is whether any differ-
ence really exists between showing an actual majority against the union, and showing an
employer's reasonable good faith doubt that the union retains its majority status. The two
alternatives which result in a rejection of the predecessor's collective bargaining representa-
tive should not require the same criteria for proof, i.e., that a majority of employees must
sign a decertification petition at their own instigation. Although it has been stated that a
reasonable good faith doubt does not require actual proof that a majority of employees do
not support the union, an employer cannot satisfy his burden of proof by resting exclusively
on unreliable employee assertions. NLRB v. Cornell of Calif., Inc., 577 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.
1978).
Zim's Foodliner, Inc, v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974),
offers a thorough background to the law of good faith doubt. Id. at 1139-42. Certification of a
union by the Board after an election creates an almost conclusive presumption of continued
majority status for a reasonable period of time, usually one year. Thereafter, there exists a
rebuttable presumption of majority representation. This presumption does not prevent the
incumbent employer from petitioning the Board for a new election. See NLRB v. Laystrom
Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966); nor does it affect the employees' statutory right to
seek a decertification election upon a showing of substantial interest. See 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1976). The effect of the presumption is merely to require the employer to
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An incumbent employer's good faith doubt of the union's majority
status arises under different circumstances than the good faith
doubt of a successor.33 In the context of a successor, the need for
stability in labor-management relations may be greater than under
normal circumstances. The period which follows a change in com-
pany ownership may be a time when the employees most need and
want union representation to protect themselves against extreme
changes in working conditions and loss of rights accrued under past
collective bargaining." On the other hand, a change in the company
ownership might also change the employees' perception of their
employer and consequently their sentiments toward the union."5
This would, therefore, engender a need for flexibility in the law's
prerequisites for finding a reasonable good faith doubt. Unfortun-
ately, neither cases nor commentators on the subject have ever dis-
tinguished between the "objective criteria" needed for the reasona-
ble good faith doubt of an incumbent employer, and that needed for
a successor. The identity of the successor may be relevant to the
employees' changing sentiments. On the other hand, the identity of
the incumbent employer, who questions the union's majority status,
has not changed, and thus, is not a factor in the employees' chang-
ing sentiments. As a result, a presumption of the employees' con-
tinuing support for the union may be weakened by a change in
business ownership. This is especially true when the employees have
an option to work elsewhere and choose not to do so. 31
The kind of evidence which has been accepted by the Board to
overcome a rebuttable presumption of the union's majority sup-
port 37 usually involves employees' written expressions in an election
bargain with the union that represented the predecessor unless (1) the union has in fact lost
its majority status or (2) reasonable grounds exist for good faith doubt'as to the continuing
majority support for the union. Because there is some risk involved if the employer refuses
to bargain, it is the better practice for the employer to continue to bargain while petitioning
for a new election. 495 F.2d at 1139. However, a successor is not required to file a petition for
a representation election to demonstrate good faith doubt as to the majority status of the
union. NLRB y. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1964).
33. See note 22 supra.
34. See Bargaining Obligations, supra note 2, at 762.
35. Id. at 763.
36. Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (1978). The Administrative
Law Judge included these facts in his opinion, although the First Circuit did not consider
them on appeal. 590 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1978).
37. After a union is certified by election as the bargaining representative, there is a
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because they are the most reliable indication of free choice. 31
Oral expressions of other employees' dissatisfaction have never
been trusted as sufficiently indicative of the majority's free choice,
Statements by a minority of unit employees that a majority are
against the union have never justified an incumbent employer's
doubt of union majority status without reasonable supporting evi-
dence. On the other hand, statements by a majority of employees
to be employed by the successor against the union had not been
considered as independent evidence of reasonable good faith doubt
until NLRB v. Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc."0
II. The Ramifications of Middleboro
A. Facts and Policy
In NLRB v. Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc.," a manufacturer of
custom-made fire-fighting vehicles, decided to liquidate its service
department and a successor company was formed to perform the
function of the defunct department. The new company's work force
was composed of seven unionized employees of the predecessor's
service department, and three recently hired employees who were
not members of the union.'" The Board held,' 3 and the First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, that the successor failed to establish a
reasonably based good faith doubt of the union's majority status
even though the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
"certification period" of twelve months. See note 32 supra. During that time, the union is
irrebuttably presumed to have majority status, barring "unusual circumstances." After
that period, the presumption becomes rebuttable. For a discussion of "unusual circum-
stances," see Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining Representatives, 47 TuL.
L. REV. 961, 966 (1973).
38. National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974). There, reasonable
good faith doubt was evidenced by a thirty percent vote of employees supporting' decertifica-
tion combined with other indicia of anti-union sentiment. These included the fact that fewer
employees elected to have union dues checked off than had done so the year previously, an
increase in employee turnover and an increase in union resignations. Id.
39. NLRB v. Cornell of Calif.,Inc., 577 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
40. 590 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1978). See notes 41-48 infra and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. From the Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact, it is not clear when union
certification originally took place nor is it clear when the predecessor signed its most recent
union contract.
43. 234 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (1978).
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indicated the following:" (1) six out of seven of the employees who
had been associated with the predecessor orally expressed approval
of the successor's intention to be a non-union shop; (2) the successor
had been director of the predecessor's service department and knew
each employee personally; hence, interviews where the employees
expressed their opinions were conducted on an informal basis at the
employees' homes and at a bar, both individually and in groups; (3)
the purpose of the interviews was not to discuss the employee-union
affiliation, but to discuss employment possibilities with the succes-
sor; (4) in each case, the employees initiated discussion about the
union; and (5) the successor gave all former employees of the prede-
cessor the option to work for the new company, seek work elsewhere,
or "bump" into the main plant." Although the court questioned the
viability of these bumping rights," four other employees success-
fully bumped into the main plant instead of going with the succes-
sor.
47
In Middleboro, the court affirmed the Board's order that the suc-
cessor bargain, despite the fact that a majority of the predecessor's
employees told the successor that they agreed with his position
against the union. The decision can be criticized for two reasons.
First, whether or not the court's conclusion is consistent with na-
44. In a conversation with the predecessor's employees, the potential (successor)
employer in Middleboro said "[w]e don't have any agreement with anybody and don't think
we have any obligation to deal with anybody." Two employees then responded by laughing
and exclaiming "good." Three more employees responded "in words to the effect that [they
were] glad the way things were going to happen." One employee expressed concern about
the status of the predecessor's pension program which the successor did not intend to con-
tinue.
The successor eventually hired all these employees. In addition, he hired three employees,
two of which had worked for the predecessor at one time or another, and one who had not.
45. The fact that an employee is given the opportunity to "bump" into the main plant
means that he can remain employed with the company from which Middleboro Fire Appara-
tus separated to become a "successor."
46. 590 F.2d at 9.
47. The Middleboro court implies that the bumping rights were not useful because there
were facts supporting the contention that the predecessor was in financial trouble and may
not have been able to stay in operation, thus making it impractical to stay with the predeces-
sor's unionized organization. Even if this contention were proven to be true, the option of
bumping into the main plant probably represented a more secure future than entering into
an entirely untested business with the successor. Hence, it is probably inaccurate to suggest
that the successor's offer to let all employees bump into the main plant was not a realistic
alternative.
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tional policy, it is based upon an inflexible generalization not
grounded in empirical fact," and may be inconsistent with the goal
of employee free choice. Second, the decision was affirmed by the
court without requiring the Board to adequately justify its conclu-
sion with supporting facts.
B. Potential For Inconsistent Decisions
Middleboro is representative of a trend in the Board's decisions
regarding an employer's good faith doubt of the union's majority
status,4" and has ramifications for all representation proceedings.'
The primary fear in accepting employee assertions as legitimate
"objective criteria" of an employer's good faith doubt is that they
are unreliable if spoken in the presence of an overbearing, anti-
union employer. The Board appears to require corroborating evi-
dence of the fact that the employees initiate the anti-union com-
ment of their own free will.5 Admittedly, the exact meaning of
employee assertions is not ascertainable because it is impossible to
understand precisely the nuances of an employee's discussions with
other employees and with his employer. In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Board apparently responds by treating all employee asser-
tions to a prospective employer as the product of coercion, absent
48. This generalization was made in the Board's opinion in Middleboro:
Statements made by employees during the course of an interview with a prospective
employer that they approve of his unqualified position that he has no contract and is
not obligated to bargain with the union claiming to represent them are not voluntary,
uncoerced expressions of employee sentiment upon which their employer can rely in
asserting a good faith doubt of an incumbent union's majority status.
234 N.L.R.B. at 894. The court notes that this reads like a conclusion of law and, if intended
as such, would be erroneous because "statements are objective, identifiable acts on which
other things being equal, an employer ought to be able to rely." 590 F.2d at 9 n.8.
49. All the cases previously discussed assume that free choice must be exhibited, at least
in part, by objective acts initiated by the employees themselves. The court in Middleboro
assumes free choice cannot be objectively made in an interview with a prospective employer
despite the fact that employee assertions are "objective identifiable acts." 590 F.2d at 9. Even
though as a matter of law, the court believes the Board's decision may have been unwar-
ranted, it accepted the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge, which were adopted
by the Board, as determinative of the fact that there was no free choice. Id.
50. Questions of representation can arise whenever an incumbent employer refuses to
bargain with the union because of a good faith doubt of union majority status or where a
successor expresses a similar doubt.
51. Phil-Modes, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 944, 959 (1966), enforced, NLRB v. Phil-Modes, Inc.,
396 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1968).
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corroborating evidence to the contrary. 2 This inclination is moti-
vated by the need for predictability in an area of law otherwise
defined only by the many diverse fact patterns presented to the
Board.
The Board's inclination in this regard is understandable. How-
ever, in the few cases that include consideration of direct assertions
by employees against the union wherein the successor's good faith
doubt was held justifiable, the corroborating evidence usually had
little bearing on employee free choice. In one case,53 four of seven
employees asked the employer to disassociate himself from the
union. The corroborating evidence presented was that three out of
seven employees had left the successor for unknown reasons. In
another case,54 twenty-five of forty-seven employees informed the
successor that they did not favor the union; additional evidence
showed that the successor filed a petition for an election and an
employee supervisor complained she wanted no part of the union.
In a third case,55 the Board established the existence of good faith
doubt when all employees expressed dissatisfaction with the union
to their supervisors. Corroborating evidence showed that the succes-
sor had bargained with the union in three sessions after adopting the
union contract, and had filed a petition for election with the Board
after the employees had expressed their dissatisfaction. In none of
these -three illustrative cases can one reasonably conclude that the
corroborating evidence was determinative of the employees' unen-
52. In Middleboro the court so stated. 590 F.2d at 9 n.7. Also see NLRB v. Cornell of
Calif., Inc., 577 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1978), where the court admits that employee assertions
might be sufficient to prove good faith doubt if accompanied by "special indicia of reliabil-
ity." It is interesting to note, however, that Phil-Modes, Inc., stated that "ordinarily evidence
that employees reported or communicated to supervisors that they . . . wished to withdraw
from the Union, absent any contemporaneous unfair labor practices, warrants a finding of
good-faith doubt as to majority." 159 N.L.R.B. at 959. In addition, Middleboro stated that
"[clertainly an employee's statement can form the basis for an employer's doubt as to that
employee." 590 F.2d at 8. The court's characterization of these employee assertions as
"objective identifiable acts" makes the Board's finding that statements made during the
course of an interview with a prospective employer are not reliable expressions of employee
free choice seem unreasonable in light of the fact that the successor's president had worked
as a department head of those prospective employees in the predecessor's company and knew
them personally.
53. Paramount Paper Products Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1068 (1965).
54. Raymond Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 494, 496 (1975).
55. Faye Nursing Home, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 658 (1974).
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cumbered free choice. Yet, without apparent'good reason, the Board
required additional evidence as an indication of free choice.
Where, in addition to proof of employees' oral expressions, other
corroborating evidence of employee free choice is required, it is not
sound legal method for a court to hold that an employer's good faith
doubt was justified on the basis of such token evidence of the alleged
free choice. If the corroborating evidence is relevant, it should re-
flect the Board's policy to insure employee free choice of a bargain-
ing representative. Otherwise, this type of analysis leaves room for
inconsistent judgments.56 The process of legal analysis used in the
cases previously mentioned is unpredictable because the result is
dependent on combinations of facts. These cases illustrate the ex-
tent to which this type of approach can produce an unjustified result
which is not necessarily consistent with employee free choice.
C. Generalizations Not Based Upon Empirical Fact
The Board reasons that an employer has a reasonable good faith
doubt if the objective considerations justifying his belief are so con-
vincing as to indicate that he has not violated the employees' right
to freedom of choice.57 In Middleboro, the Board held that employee
assertions to a prospective employer are not reliable indicators of
unencumbered free choice because their meaning is ambiguous.
However, where the meaning of employee assertions to an employer
is ambiguous to an impartial observer, such assertions may, in fact,
be truly representative of employee preferences for several reasons
evident in Middleboro. First, the employees spoke up against the
union and it is probably improper to discount all their remarks. If
only one half of the employee assertions were truly uncoerced, it is
arguable that a majority of the ten employees eventually hired by
56. An example of inconsistency in the context of good faith doubt is contained in Houston
Shopping News Co., 233 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1977). There, only 12 out of 31 employees told the
employer that they were against the union. The Administrative Law Judge noted that the
Board had stated in other decisions that there is no necessary correlation between member-
ship and the number of union supporters, since no one will know how many employees who
favor the union do not become or remain members thereof. In the same case, however, the
ALJ inferred that four other employees were against the union because they were not mem-
bers, thereby giving a majority to the employees who opposed unionization and making the
employer's good faith doubt reasonable.
57. NLRB v. Cornell of Calif., Inc., 577 F.2d 513, 515-17 (9th Cir. 1978).
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the successor did not favor the union." Second, as the predecessor's
employees they were forced to join the union under a union-security
clause. 9 Third, the option to bump into the predecessor's plant was
apparently a viable one, 0 yet a majority of the employees in the
predecessor's service department did not exercise this option. If the
employees opposed the union, why did they not file a decertification
petition with the Board or present a similar written expression of
discontent to the successor? One plausible reason is that they were
not aware of this alternative, being fire truck repairmen and not
attorneys. The absence of such a petition, for whatever reason,
should not justify the presumption of majority status with the pres-
ence of employee assertions to the contrary.
The result of Middleboro illustrates the extent to which the prin-
ciple of employee free choice has been subordinated to the goal of
maintaining stable and continuing bargaining relationships by re-
stricting representational challenges to the union's majority status.
There are two devices used by the Board to reduce the number of
representational challenges and promote the union's ability to effec-
tively represent its employees. One device, the "certification-bar,"
has already been described. 6 The second device, known as the
"contract-bar," prevents any representational challenge to a union
within three years after the employer has recognized the exclusive
bargaining representative.2 A successor who acquires the predeces-
sor's company during that three year period need not abide by the
terms of the contract, but has a duty to bargain unless he can show
reasonable good faith doubt of the union's majority status. 3
In Middleboro, the length of the predecessor's outstanding con-
58. Of the six employee assertions made to the prospective employer (successor), three
may be hypothesized as uncoerced. In addition, three new employees were eventually hired
for which there can be no reasonable presumption of pro-union sentiments. In this hypotheti-
cal situation, six employees (a majority of those who would eventually work for the successor),
cannot be presumed to favor the union.
59. This fact is not significant in itself. Most collective bargaining agreements have this
provision. However, it is relevant that the predecessor's employees were obligated to join the
union within a certain time after the commencement of work regardless of their desire to do
SO.
60. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
61. See note 37 supra.
62. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, 406 U.S. 272, 290 (1972). This rule was origi-
nally expressed in General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
63. 406 U.S. at 291.
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tract was not an issue in the case. If the successor had refused to
bargain either during the term of the contract, or within a three year
period of the last election if the contract was more than three years
in duration, then the "contract-bar" rule would have precluded the
successor from petitioning for an election to determine actual major-
ity status. Nevertheless, in Middleboro it is arguable that the em-
ployees' right of free choice was impinged upon to the extent that
the Board refused to consider employee assertions as evidence of a
successor's reasonable good faith doubt of the union's majority sta-
tus. Perhaps it would serve the national labor policy better to con-
duct an election as an objective measure of union status in the
successor context, despite the benefits of the "certification-bar" and
"contract-bar" rules."
D. The Problem of Judicial Review
1. Background
In Middleboro, the court recognized that statements by employ-
ees are "objective identifiable acts" on which "other things being
equal an employer ought to be able to rely." 5 The Board, however,
was recognized as having a "seasoned feeling for the meaning of
events in the labor-management setting,""6 and therefore the court
deferred to the Board's decision that these employee assertions did
not justify the successor's reasonable good faith doubt. Admittedly,
the court does not possess the same ability as the Board to review
the facts of cases in the labor context, nor to interpret their mean-
ing. 7 Courts have frequently expressed dismay, however, at the
Board's disinclination to explain the reasoning behind its decisions
in representation proceedings."6 This hampers the court's ability to
64. Requiring an election before a successor's duty to bargain would eliminate doubt
about the union's continuing majority status which may surface from a change in employers.
65. 590 F.2d at 9.
66. Id.
67. NLRB v. Matouk Indus., 582 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1978). The court notes that
statutory law gives the ultimate responsibility of resolving labor disputes to the Board, citing
29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Id. For background on the power of the Board to resolve labor disputes
and the courts' ability to review those decisions, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB., 340
U.S. 474, 492 (1951).
68. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1971).
The procedural process leading to judicial review should be described. A party may com-
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intelligently review those decisions in order to insure the integrity
of the administrative process."
Commentators have long noted the dilemma caused by the inher-
ent difficulty in reviewing federal administrative decisions, espe-
cially in the labor context. 0 The problem of balancing the need for
the Board to pursue an independent labor policy with the concomi-
tant need for protection of private parties given by judicial review
has been expressed.7 The courts have been reluctant to disagree
with determinations made by the Board." Yet in Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 73 the Supreme Court noted that the Administrative
Procedure Act7' and the Taft-Hartley Act 5 direct the courts to as-
sume more responsibility for the reasonableness of Board deci-
sions." "Reviewing courts must be influenced by the feeling that
they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function."77
Board decisions often involve an incumbent employer who com-
mits unfair labor practices which affect the outcome of future elec-
tions or the atmosphere in which they can be held.7 In this context,
bargaining orders issued by the Board have often been denied en-
plain of an unfair labor practice to a Regional Director of the Board. The Regional Director
will refer the case to a trial examiner who investigates the facts and returns to report to the
Regional Director. He will decide if there is justification for the issue of a formal complaint.
If he feels sufficient justification exists he will set a date for a hearing presided over by an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ will write up an intermediate report for the Board
and will recommend a cease and desist order, a bargaining order, or that no action be taken.
If either party disagrees with the ALU's decision he may file exceptions and appeal to the
Board. The Board's decision is subject to judicial review by the circuit court of appeals
where the unfair labor practice occurred or, under certain circumstances in the District
of Columbia Circuit. A. Cox, D. BOK, R. A. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 113-
22 (1977).
69. Peerless of America v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 1973).
70. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Review of Representation Cases Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 28 GEO. L.J. 666 (1970).
71. Note, Judicial Reviewability of NLRB Rulings, 63 Nw. L. REv. 106, 107 (1968).
72. See, e.g., Boire v. Miami-Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 24 (5th Cir. 1965).
73. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
74. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1976).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
76. 340 U.S. at 488-90.
77. Id. at 490.
78. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). There, the Court required
that the Board make "specific findings" as to the impact of unfair labor practices on the
election process, and that it also make a detailed analysis assessing the possibility of holding
a fair election. Id. at 610-16.
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forcement,79 or remanded for "specific findings" of fact and legal
analysis, 0 because the Board's conclusions were not supported by
an adequate factual basis or cogent legal argument."' The reasons
for the courts' requirement of "specific findings" from the Board are
three-fold. First, the requirement serves to limit administrative ar-
bitrariness." Second, the "substitution of conclusion for explana-
tion does not permit the reviewing court to do its job."8 Finally, the
requirements of "specific findings" and detailed analysis84 contrib-
ute to the goal of predictability in labor law.
The role of the judiciary in controlling the discretion with which
the Board can make its decisions is limited. The scope of judicial
review fits into two identifiable categories: (a) questions of fact as
to which the scope of review is limited and (b) questions of law as
to which the scope of review is independent, thus not dependent on
the decision of the administrative agency. 5 Thus, whether a court
may alter the decision of the Board hinges on a determination of
whether that decision is based upon a question of law or fact.
The decision-making process of the Board is such that it gathers
"basic"" facts from which it will infer "ultimate" 7 facts which ex-
press a conclusion. Upon review, the court requires "substantial
evidence" ' to support the Board's finding. The "basic" facts must
79. See, e.g., Peerless of America v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973).
80. See, e.g., NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1976).
81. In Peerless of America v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (1973), the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals attempted to explain its interpretation of the requirement of "specific findings":
[W]e hardly mean that the Board must determine how many employees actually
were caused to abandon the Union. We mean only that it estimate the impact, taking
into account the factors in the particular case which are indicative of actual effect or
which plausibly, in the light of existing knowledge, would contribute to or detract from
an actual impact. This is, after all, what the courts which have made their own
analyses have done.
Id. at 1118 n.16.
82. Id. at 1119.
83. Id.; accord, NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1976); NLRB
v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Gen. Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894,
901 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. American Cable Systems, 427 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1970).
84. 535 F.2d at 245.
85. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P.L. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS
251 (7th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN].
86. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
87. Id.
88. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
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provide relevant evidence which a "reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.""9 Thus, although the court
may disagree with the Board's interpretation of "basic" facts pre-
sented, it will defer to the Board's conclusion as long as the infer-
ence from "basic" to "ultimate" fact is reasonable. This method of
review "in theory, tells a judge not to weigh evidence, determine
credibility of witnesses, or choose from among various reasonable
inferences or between conflicting testimony." '
2. Judicial Review in Middleboro
Given the above description of the scope of judicial review, the
issue becomes whether the Board's declaration that "statements
made by employees during the course of an interview with a pro-
spective employer . . . are not voluntary, uncoerced expressions of
employee sentiment . . ."0., is reasonable. As a factual inference
from the "basic" facts of this situation, the Board's conclusion is
reasonable only because employee free choice is ambiguous. Thus,
the inference is considered reasonable because it is plausible. The
court noted, however, that this conclusion "with its general lan-
guage, reads like a conclusion of law. . . . If it were so intended it
would be wrong for the reasons explained in the text. Ordinarily,
in such a case we would feel compelled to remand to the Board to
make a finding of fact under the correct standard of law."'" In de-
ference to the Board's decision, however, the court stated that the
decision should not be further delayed "since the conjunction of
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938). "Accordingly, 'it must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of
the fact to be established . . . it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal
to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.' "
340 U.S. at 477 (citing Labor Bd. v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292,
300 (1939)). "Review under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency
action taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself
. . . or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing." Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
89. 340 U.S. at 477.
90. Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process,
28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 84 (1959).
90.1. 590 F.2d at 9.
91. Id. at 9 n.8. There were no clear reasons given in the text of the opinion explaining
why the Board's conclusion would be wrong if intended as a conclusion of law. The court
may be referring to the notion that uhcoerced employee assertions are considered to be the
most reliable examples of "objective criteria" used to show a reasonable good faith doubt,
and would thus be reliable even if made to a prospective employer. Id.
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several detailed circumstances listed in the ALJ's conclusion en-
ables us, with some straining, to treat it as a factual finding." 2
The ALJ's findings indicated no causal connection between the
"detailed circumstances" listed in his conclusion and the em-
ployees' coercion presumed by the Board. The court only referred
to the Board's alleged expertise in judging the impact of such fact
situations upon employee free choice. 3 The Board based its
decision on a general principle, akin to a rule of law, rather than
articulating specifically how it made an inference from "basic"
facts. If the Board's inference was actually a conclusion of law, the
court should have been able to exercise its prerogative to review
the inference independent of the Board's determination.
Although the court's holding in Middleboro may have properly
given deference to the Board's discretion under current standards
of administrative law,94 the decision leaves the impression that the
court did not require a detailed analysis of the relationship between
the "basic" facts (the successor's actions) and the Board's inference
from those facts (that the employees were unable to express their
free choice). There are at least three reasons why the scope of judi-
cial review should be enlarged in the successor context when em-
ployee free choice is unquestionably ambiguous."
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. In considering the scope of judicial review of an administrative agency's decision, both
the statute governing the conduct of the agency in question and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1977), must be consulted. One authority has noted that there are
two "threshhold questions" when considering the scope of review: (a) What is the alleged error
the complaining party contends the agency has committed? (b) What is the scope of the
power or discretion which the legislature has delegated to the agency? GELLHORN, supra note
85, at 251. The analysis of the proper scope of judicial review will vary according to whether
or not the agency is interpreting a fact situation which involves a "statutory term." If a
statutory term is interpreted, Judge Friendly's opinion in NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286
F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), provides an interesting analysis. In Middleboro, interpretation of a
statutory term was not involved, so the question to be addressed is whether the Board's
conclusion was one of law or fact. For an excellent discussion of the scope of review of an
agency's factual finding see GELLHORN, supra note 85, at 251-56.
95. For an excellent discussion of the need to expand the scope of judicial review see
Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 436 (1954). Schwartz suggests four reasons why the
judiciary should be given more authority in the process of review: (a) Judges are more prag-
matic in their outlook than administrative commissioners, (b) the work of judges is subject
to closer public scrutiny than that of their administrative counterparts, (c) judges have
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First, by not holding the Board responsible for an explanation of
its findings of the impact of a successor's conduct upon employee
free choice, the court is encouraging administrative arbitrariness."
The issue in most unfair labor practice proceedings is whether the
employer's conduct has a tendency to interfere with an employee's
statutory rights. 7 If the Board's decision is cast in specific terms
(e.g., the employees' right to free choice of a bargaining representa-
tive or to collective action has been inhibited based upon specific
facts), the court can disagree with the Board's conclusions or re-
mand for further specific findings to support the conclusion, without
questioning the Board's discretion regarding the impact of employer
conduct upon employee free choice." The Board's decision, how-
ever, was made in general terms" (e.g., employee assertions to pro-
spective employers are unreliable per se); thus, the Board was given
a measure of independence from judicial review.
A second reason why the scope of judicial review should be en-
larged in the successor context is the Board's lack of empirical data
to justify its analysis of the impact of employer conduct upon em-
ployee freedom of choice.'" The Board has stated that it does not
attempt to assess the actual effect of employer conduct on employ-
ees, "but rather concerns itself with whether it is reasonable to
conclude that the conduct tended to prevent free formation and
expression of the employees' free choice.""" Hence, the Board's deci-
sions Are based on assumptions not subject to review.
Third, an enlarged scope of judicial review will allow the judiciary
to balance the right of individuals to contract and invest in the
formation of capital and the right of employees to collectively bar-
gain.1°  The national labor policy as interpreted by the Board dis-
courages the individual rights of private businessmen in starting
acquired more perspective, and (d) the judiciary "has the potential advantage of coordinated
direction with ultimate responsibility in one Supreme Court. Id. at 471-75.
96. See note 77 supra.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1975).
98. Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 681
(1972).
99. Id. at 686.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 682 (citing 33 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 60 (1969)). See also Murray Envelope Co.,
130 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1576 (1961).
102. See Bargaining Obligations, supra note 2, at 759.
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small businesses from the unionized work force of a larger company
such as Middleboro's predecessor. The smaller successor cannot
expect to provide financial benefits to his employees similar to those
accrued through collective bargaining between the union and the
larger, established predecessor company.
Recently, one authority has stated:03
The proper scope of judicial review of governmental agency action can only
be stated in general terms ....
It must take account of the difference in private interests that may be
affected, for example as between infringement of individual rights and the
allocation of public goods and services among groups with conflicting inter-
ests.
Under the circumstances of Middleboro the court had an opportun-
ity to perform a balancing of the rights of individual successors and
employees whose accrued rights through collective bargaining are
protected by the national labor policy. The scope of judicial review
of administrative decisions does not currently allow this kind of
intervention by the court to reverse a factual finding or alter an
order to bargain issued by the Board.104 However, one can argue
that, by affirming an order to bargain under the circumstances of
Middleboro without requiring an election, the court furthered the
employees' right to collectively bargain at the unnecessary expense
of their free choice and consequently, the successor's freedom to
contract.
III. Conclusion
The successor doctrine is governed by the often conflicting goals
of national labor policy: employee free choice and industrial stabil-
ity through effective collective action. In defining which "objective
criteria" are appropriate to justify reasonable good faith doubt of a
union's majority status, there are two problems with the Board's
analyses and the courts' deference to those decisions.
The first problem is substantive. Good faith doubt is easily de-
103. American Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards
Relating to Appellate Courts 98 (Final Draft 1977) (quoted in GELLHORN, supra note 85, at
250).
104. Administrative agencies have been delegated the authority to carry out policy as
developed by Congress. For a good discussion of the changing role of agencies see GELLHORN,
supra note 85, at 12-13.
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fined by cataloging fact situations where doubt has, and has not,
been found.'0 In the successor context, however, reasonable good
faith doubt should be found where the employees have expressed
their unencumbered free choice against the predecessor's collective
bargaining representative. If employee assertions seriously cast
doubt upon the union's majority status, free choice may be sacri-
ficed to an unjustifiable extent if union representation is allowed to
continue without a new election when the factual basis for presum-
ing employee support of the union is changed, and most likely dim-
inished. Giving the successor the ability to avoid the obligation to
bargain altogether is an unsatisfactory alternative. Where ambigu-
ity concerning the employees' attitude toward the union exists, an
election to determine the status of the union is preferable to a reli-
ance on presumptions.
Apart from the problems incident to employee assertions, there
should be an increased effort by the Board to rationalize each of its
decisions which center on good faith doubt in the successor context
with the goals of national labor policy. The Board has made general-
izations such as that in Middleboro based on preconceptions of the
impact of employer conduct on employee free choice which are
overly broad and leave room for inconsistency. This approach does
not adequately balance the goals of employee free choice and in-
dustrial stability. The Board appears to require evidence tanta-
mount to actual proof of the employees' free choice to justify a
reasonable good faith doubt.'0 In the interest of consistency, actual
proof in the form of an election should be required of it to issue a
bargaining order to a successor when the factual basis for presuming
the union's majority status has been changed.
The second problem is procedural: to what extent should the
courts defer to the Board's informed judgment in the successor
context? Clearly, they should not affirm an order to bargain without
understanding the Board's rationale. If the court defers to the
Board's decision based upon variables, the effect of which is not
justified or supported in the Board's decision,"'7 then it cannot de-
105. See notes 23-32 supra and accompanying text.
106. See note 32 supra.
107. The Board's decision affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion which is,
in effect, a conclusion of law. The court stated that it would ordinarily remand such a case
for the Board to make a finding of fact based upon the correct standard of law. However, due
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cide whether the Board's finding is truly based upon "substantial
evidence." '0 It would be preferable that the court remand for fur-
ther consideration of the factual data.
The ability of a court to understand the Board's rationale takes
on added significance in the successor context. Judicial review can
protect private parties from decisions of an administrative agency.
Specifically, judicial review can protect the successor's rights to
freedom of contract and to the free movement and formation of
capital. To further this goal, the Board should apply more objective
means of ascertaining employee free choice, and the courts should
insist on more thorough analysis from the Board in order to avoid
the type of vague legal argument made in the Middleboro decision.
Peter Blasier
to "several detailed circumstances listed in the AL's conclusion," which actually stated a
conclusion of law, the Board's decision was treated as a factual finding. The court concluded
that "[o]bviously this kind of problem is one easily avoided by more careful expression."
590 F.2d at 9.
108. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1951), noted that:
the substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight. . . . Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court
is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find
that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial when viewed in the light that
the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the
Board's view.
Id. at 488.
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